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OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
  
 A jury convicted William Ronald Boney 
(“Boney”) of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), & 846; attempting to 
retaliate against a witness, victim, or informant in 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B); and solicitation 
of a person to retaliate against a witness, victim, or 
informant, as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B), in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373. The United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware sentenced Boney to a 
term of imprisonment of 220 months on each of these 
counts and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. 
Boney appealed, challenging his conviction. The 
government cross-appealed, arguing that the District 
Court erred in calculating the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) range for two counts of Boney’s 
conviction. 
We will affirm Boney’s conviction, but conclude 
that the District Court misapplied the Sentencing 
Guidelines when it sentenced Boney. Thus, we will 
vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for 
resentencing. 
I. 
A. 
 In 2010, Boney brokered a multi-kilogram cocaine 
transaction. Philip Haines (“Haines”), whom Boney had 
known for several years and who had previously sold 
Boney drugs, informed Boney that he was looking for a 
drug supplier who could sell him large quantities of 
cocaine. Boney told Haines that he was familiar with 
drug traffickers who sold large amounts of cocaine and 
agreed to make an introduction on Haines’s behalf. 
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Haines agreed to pay Boney a fee of $10,000 for each 
such transaction that he brokered.  
Unbeknownst to Boney, however, Haines was 
working as a confidential informant for the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) at the time, and 
the cocaine deal was a sting operation. In autumn of 
2010, Boney informed Haines that he had located a seller 
from New Jersey who could supply Haines with five to 
ten kilograms of cocaine. Haines provided the DEA with 
information about Boney’s efforts to plan the transaction 
and tipped off the DEA as to the date the transaction was 
to occur.  
The deal occurred at Boney’s house in Delaware 
on November 7, 2010. With Haines’s cooperation, the 
DEA recorded several telephone calls between Boney 
and Haines on this day, during which Boney stated that 
the sellers were ready to proceed with the transaction. 
Boney met Haines at the house and introduced Haines to 
the sellers. The DEA surveilled the house during the 
transaction. However, when the agents believed they had 
been spotted by one of the conspirators, the DEA raided 
the house. The DEA arrested Boney, along with four 
other individuals, and seized several kilograms of 
cocaine.  
 After his arrest, Boney agreed to cooperate with 
law enforcement and was released to assist in the 
investigation of other drug traffickers. However, Boney 
had a contentious relationship with his DEA handling 
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officer and his cooperation with law enforcement 
ultimately turned sour. As a result, by spring 2011, the 
government had begun to take steps to prosecute Boney 
for his role in the November 2010 cocaine transaction.  
 In May 2011, the DEA received information from 
another informant, Ishmael Garrett (“Garrett”), that 
Boney was attempting to recruit a hit man to murder 
Haines. Garrett had previously been arrested for drug 
violations and was cooperating with the DEA in the hope 
that the sentence he would eventually receive would 
reflect his cooperation. The DEA developed a plan to 
have Garrett pose as a hit man and meet with Boney.  
 Boney and Garrett met for the first time on May 
22, 2011. During their conversation—which the DEA 
surreptitiously recorded—Boney indicated that he was 
furious that Haines had “set [him] up” in the November 
2010 cocaine transaction and solicited Garrett to kill 
Haines in exchange for $8,000. See S.A. 21, 24. Boney 
further requested that, if it was not possible to kill 
Haines, he wanted Garrett to kill Haines’s newborn child. 
See S.A. 24 (“[I]f he ain’t, if he ain’t there, I’ll be honest 
with you I want his kid dead.”). During this conversation, 
Garrett stated that he needed to see a picture of Haines to 
commit the murder. Boney showed him a picture of 
Haines from Facebook, which revealed Haines’s face as 
well as several identifying tattoos. S.A. 23; see also S.A. 
491, 496–97. Boney also provided Garrett with 
identifying details about Haines, including the fact that 
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he lived in Philadelphia and that he had a warehouse in 
Smyrna, Delaware. S.A. 27, 29.  
 Boney met with Garrett two more times, on June 
15 and July 3, 2011. During their meetings, Boney 
discussed payment arrangements for the hit on Haines, 
including providing detailed information about various 
locations in the Delaware area that Garrett could rob to 
obtain the money, giving Garrett the names of people 
who owed money to Boney so that Garrett could collect 
directly from them, and discussing the possibility of 
paying Garrett in marijuana.   
B. 
 Boney was arrested on July 19, 2011. On April 12, 
2012, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment 
charging Boney with: Count I, conspiracy to distribute 
500 or more grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), & § 846; Count II, attempting to 
kill another person with intent to retaliate against that 
person for providing to a law enforcement officer 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B); Count III, obstruction of justice 
by soliciting a person to kill a witness for the United 
States in a related pending criminal case in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); and Count IV, solicitation of a 
person to attempt to kill another with intent to retaliate 
for providing information to a law enforcement officer 
relating to the commission or possible commission of a 
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Federal offense, as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1513(a)(1)(B), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373.  
A jury convicted Boney on Counts I, II, and IV 
and acquitted him on Count III. Because Boney had a 
prior felony drug conviction, Count I carried a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment and a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment, a fine of 
$8,000,000, and a minimum of eight years’ of supervised 
release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Count II carried a 
maximum sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B). Count IV carried a maximum 
sentence of twenty years imprisonment because the crime 
that Boney solicited (murder) was punishable by life 
imprisonment or death. See 18 U.S.C. § 373(a).  
 On June 12, 2013, the District Court sentenced 
Boney using the 2012 edition of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
1
 Boney was assigned a 
criminal history category of III based on his prior felony 
drug conviction and other non-drug offenses. See 
                                                 
1
  District courts must apply the Sentencing Guidelines 
that are “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced,” 
except when such application would violate the ex post facto 
clause of the Constitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). See 
also Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013); 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11 (2012). The 
2012 edition was the operative version of the Guidelines 
Manual on the date Boney was sentenced. This appeal 
involves no ex post facto challenge. 
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Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), pp. 16–18.  
As to Count I, the District Court calculated 
Boney’s offense level consistent with the probation 
office’s recommendation in the PSR. Applying offense 
guideline § 2D1.1 (Offenses Involving Drugs and Narco-
Terrorism), the District Court determined that Count I 
carried a base offense level of 30, which when combined 
with a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, 
yielded an adjusted offense level of 32. See Joint 
Appendix (“J.A.”) II–366. 
 However, the District Court rejected the PSR’s 
recommendation as to Counts II and IV. For Count II, the 
PSR recommended that the District Court apply U.S.S.G. 
§ 2A2.1(a) (Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; 
Attempted Murder), and for Count IV, the PSR 
recommended § 2A1.5(a) (Conspiracy or Solicitation to 
Commit Murder). The District Court disagreed with the 
recommendations on both of these counts, expressing 
disapproval that, in its opinion, the probation office had 
“pigeonholed” Counts II and IV into guidelines that did 
not apply to this case. J.A. II–365. Indicating that it 
“certainly [did not] believe that the attempted murder 
[guidelines] w[ere] the best fit for the facts as I heard 
them,” J.A. II–368, the District Court instead chose to 
sentence Boney under § 2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice) for 
both Counts II and IV. J.A. II–366. 
Under § 2J1.2, the base offense level was 14. For 
both Counts II and IV, the District Court applied an 8-
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level sentencing enhancement because Boney’s offense 
involved “causing or threatening to cause physical injury 
to a person,” see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) (2012), and a 2-level enhancement 
because Boney had targeted a vulnerable victim, see id. 
at § 3A1.1(b)(1).  
Grouping together the counts of conviction, the 
District Court concluded that the appropriate offense 
level for the three counts was 32. Applying that offense 
level with Boney’s criminal history category of III in the 
sentencing table, the District Court determined that the 
advisory sentencing range was 151–188 months.2 The 
District Court then varied upward and sentenced Boney 
to 220 months.  
The Government preserved its objection to the 
District Court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Boney timely appealed his conviction and the 
Government cross-appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).  
III. 
                                                 
2
  The PSR calculated Boney’s advisory range of 
imprisonment to be 360 months to life. 
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 We discern no merit in any of Boney’s arguments 
challenging his conviction.
3
 However, the government’s 
cross-appeal on sentencing merits deeper discussion. 
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that 
                                                 
3
  In his appeal, Boney argues: (1) the evidence adduced 
at trial was insufficient to support his conviction and, in so 
arguing, he raises an entrapment defense relating to the 
cocaine transaction; (2) the District Court should have 
granted his motion to suppress evidence relating to cocaine 
seized during the DEA’s raid of his house; (3) the District 
Court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a text 
message that Boney sent to his attorney shortly after his 
initial meeting with Garrett; (4) the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to sever trial on Count I from 
trial on the other counts; and (5) the District Court erred in 
denying his motion for disclosure of information relating to 
an informant that the government had used in its 
investigation. We are not persuaded by any of these 
arguments. Upon reviewing the record before us, we conclude 
that the District Court correctly denied Boney’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal. The evidence proffered at trial was 
sufficient for a rational juror to have found the elements 
supporting his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and we 
reject Boney’s argument regarding entrapment based on the 
significant evidence presented at trial that demonstrated 
Boney’s predisposition to take part in the conspiracy to sell 
cocaine. Regarding the challenges to the District Court’s 
ruling on the evidentiary and procedural motions, after 
exhaustive review of the evidence presented at trial, we 
conclude, in accordance with and for substantially the same 
reasons provided by the District Court, that none of these 
challenges have merit. Thus, we will affirm Boney’s 
conviction. 
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the District Court incorrectly applied the Sentencing 
Guidelines in calculating Boney’s sentence as to Counts 
II and IV, thus committing procedural error. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment in part and 
remand for resentencing. 
A. 
We review a sentence to ensure that the sentencing 
court “committed no significant procedural error, such as 
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range[.]” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 
51 (2007). We apply clear error review to the District 
Court’s factual findings relevant to the Guidelines and 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines. United States v. West, 
643 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
In this appeal, our review is limited to purely legal 
questions regarding the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Guidelines. Whether the District Court correctly 
calculated the guideline range according to the specific, 
mechanical process required by the Guidelines Manual is 
a legal issue. Similarly, whether the District Court 
selected the most appropriate guideline for the offense of 
conviction is a legal issue. See Aquino, 555 F.3d at 127 
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n.5.
4
 Thus, our review here is plenary. 
B. 
 In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held 
that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory, 
rather than mandatory, in the district court’s 
determination of an offender’s sentence. 543 U.S. 220 
(2005). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed that the Guidelines constitute “the lodestone 
of sentencing.” Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 
2084 (2013). Accordingly, both Supreme Court 
precedent and the decisions of this court have 
emphasized that, in sentencing an offender, the district 
court must engage in a specific multi-step process. Id. at 
2080; see also United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 
211 (3d Cir. 2008). “First, ‘a district court should begin 
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the 
applicable Guidelines range.’” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080 
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)) 
(emphasis added). This first step is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s directive that “[a]s a matter of 
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the 
                                                 
4
  Several of our sister circuits have also held that the 
sentencing court’s determination of the most appropriate 
guideline is a legal question subject to de novo review. See, 
e.g., United States v. Almeida, 710 F.3d 437, 439 (1st Cir. 
2013); United States v. Neilson, 721 F.3d 1185, 1187 (10th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1265 
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
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Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial 
benchmark” in determining a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 
49. Second, after correctly calculating the applicable 
guideline range, “[t]he district court must then consider 
the arguments of the parties and the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080 (brackets 
omitted).
5
 
“[I]n the ordinary case, the [Sentencing] 
Commission’s recommendation of a sentencing range 
will ‘reflect a rough approximation of sentences that 
might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’” Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)). Nonetheless, 
“a district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-
                                                 
5
  In decisions prior to Peugh, we characterized this as a 
three-step process, in which the sentencing court must: (1) 
correctly calculate the applicable guideline range; (2) 
formally rule on the parties’ motions and clarify for the 
record whether the sentencing court is granting a departure; 
and then (3) exercise its discretion by considering all of the 
§ 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)); United States v. 
Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United 
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006)); United 
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216–27 (3d Cir. 2008). We see 
no inconsistency between our precedent and the Supreme 
Court’s formulation in Peugh, which merely combined into a 
single step the district court’s obligation to consider the 
arguments of the parties and weigh the § 3553(a) factors.  
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Guidelines sentence based on disagreement with the 
[Sentencing] Commission’s views.” Pepper v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011) (citing Kimbrough, 
552 U.S. at 109) (brackets in original).  
However, “[t]hat a district court may ultimately 
sentence a given defendant outside the Guidelines range 
does not deprive the Guidelines of force as the 
framework for sentencing.” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083. 
Indeed, we have emphasized that “[a] correct 
[Guidelines] calculation . . . is crucial to the sentencing 
process and result,” United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 
205, 212 (3d Cir. 2008), and have admonished that 
“because the Guidelines still play an integral role in 
criminal sentencing, we require that the entirety of the 
Guidelines calculation be done correctly.” United States 
v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
citations omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that a district court commits procedural error 
where it fails to calculate the correct guideline range. 
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 
 Our focus here is on the District Court’s obligation 
to calculate accurately the applicable guideline range. 
The Guidelines Manual lays out a specific, mechanical 
process through which the sentencing court must move in 
order to arrive at the correct calculation: Section 1B1.1(a) 
instructs the sentencing court to “determine the kinds of 
sentence and the guideline range as set forth in the 
guidelines . . . by applying the provisions of this manual 
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in the following order, except as specifically directed.” 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1(a) (2012) 
(emphasis added). Section 1B1.1 lays out eight 
progressive steps that a sentencing court is required to 
follow in order to arrive at the correct guideline range. Id. 
As the first step, § 1B1.1(a)(1) instructs the 
sentencing court to “[d]etermine, pursuant to § 1B1.2 
(Applicable Guidelines), the offense guideline section 
from Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the 
offense of conviction.” Id. § 1B1.1(a)(1). Thus, the 
sentencing court must consult § 1B1.2, which in turn 
specifies that the sentencing court should determine the 
offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense 
Conduct) by “refer[ring] to the Statutory Index 
(Appendix A) to determine the Chapter Two offense 
guideline, referenced in the Statutory Index for the 
offense of conviction.” Id. § 1B1.2(a).6 The Manual 
                                                 
6
  Amendment 591 modified the Sentencing Guidelines 
to clarify that the sentencing court must use the applicable 
guideline provided in the Statutory Index (Appendix A) for 
the offense of conviction. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 1B1.2 Application Note 1 (2012) (“The court is to 
use the Chapter Two guideline section referenced in the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) for the offense of conviction.”) 
(emphasis added). As we have noted, this language indicates 
that “[t]he sentencing court no longer uses the Statutory Index 
(Appendix A) as an aid in finding the most applicable 
guideline among several possibilities; the Statutory Index 
(Appendix A) now conclusively points the court to the one 
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defines “offense of conviction” as “the offense conduct 
charged in the count of the indictment or information of 
which the defendant was convicted.” Id. Thus, the 
sentencing court must examine the indictment or 
information to determine the statutory provision 
underlying the offense of conviction, and then look up 
that statutory provision in the Statutory Index (Appendix 
A) of the Manual.
7
  
Appendix A “specifies the offense guideline 
section(s) in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable 
to the statute of conviction.” Id. Appendix A – Statutory 
Index, Introduction. In the case of some statutes (for 
example, where a particular statute proscribes a variety of 
conduct), Appendix A references multiple offense 
guidelines applicable to the statute. Where there are 
multiple offense guidelines referenced in Appendix A for 
the statute of conviction, the Manual directs the 
sentencing court to “determine which of the referenced 
guideline sections is most appropriate for the offense 
conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was 
                                                                                                             
guideline applicable in a given case.” United States v. Diaz, 
245 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). 
7
  If the offense involved a conspiracy, attempt, or 
solicitation, the sentencing court is also instructed to “refer to 
§ 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) as well as the 
guideline referenced in the Statutory Index for the substantive 
offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.2(a) 
(2012). 
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convicted.” Id. § 1B1.2 Application Note 1 (emphasis 
added).  
C. 
 With these principles in mind, we conclude that 
the District Court erred in applying the steps required by 
the Guidelines Manual as to Counts II and IV of Boney’s 
conviction.
8
 
1. Count II 
 First, the District Court incorrectly selected 
offense guideline § 2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice) in 
sentencing Boney as to Count II.  
We begin our analysis—as we must—by looking 
at the conduct charged in Count II of the indictment. See 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.2(a) (2012). 
Count II of the First Superseding Indictment charged: 
Between on or about May 22, 2011, and 
continuing through on or about July 3, 2011, 
in the State and District of Delaware, 
WILLIAM BONEY, defendant herein, did 
attempt to kill another person, to wit 
[REDACTED] with intent to retaliate 
against [REDACTED] for providing to a 
                                                 
8
  The government does not challenge the District 
Court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines as to Count 
I. 
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law enforcement officer any information 
relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense, to wit, a 
violation of Title 21, United States Code, 
Section 846, in violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 1513(a)(1)(B). 
First Superseding Indictment, J.A. II–17.9  
Since Count II charged Boney with a violation of 
18 U.S.C. 1513(a)(1)(B),
10
 the District Court was 
required to consult the Statutory Index (Appendix A) to 
determine the Chapter Two offense guideline for that 
offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) & 
§ 1B1.2 Application Note 1. The Statutory Index 
(Appendix A) lists several offense guidelines potentially 
applicable to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1513—
relevant to this appeal, among the available offense 
guidelines listed, are § 2A2.1 (Assault with Intent to 
Commit Murder; Attempted Murder) and § 2J1.2 
                                                 
9
  The version of the First Superseding Indictment 
included by the parties in the Joint Appendix includes 
redactions of the name of the intended victim (Haines) in 
Counts II, III, & IV.  
10
  18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B) provides: “Whoever kills or 
attempts to kill another person with intent to retaliate against 
any person for . . . providing to a law enforcement officer any 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be punished as 
provided in [18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(2)].” 
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(Obstruction of Justice). Critical to our consideration of 
the multiple offense guidelines potentially applicable to 
this statute is language in the Guidelines Manual 
requiring the District Court to determine which of these 
guidelines was the “most appropriate for the offense 
conduct charged in [Count II].” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 
Application Note 1. 
 The District Court selected § 2J1.2 (Obstruction of 
Justice), whereas the PSR recommended § 2A2.1 
(Attempted Murder). We conclude that the District 
Court’s selection was error.  
First, the District Court seemingly rejected 
§ 2A2.1 based on the factual information that the parties 
had presented at trial. See Transcript of Sentencing 
Hearing, J.A. II–368 (“I certainly sat through the case 
and I obviously see things differently. . . . I certainly 
don’t believe that the attempted murder [guideline] was 
the best fit for the facts as I heard them.”). However, the 
Guidelines Manual makes clear that the sentencing court 
must select the “most appropriate” guideline based on the 
offense charged in the indictment, not the court’s 
perception of the facts of the case presented at trial. See 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) (noting that the sentencing court 
must determine the offense guideline section applicable 
to “the offense conduct charged in the count of the 
indictment or information of which the defendant was 
convicted”); § 1B1.2(a) Application Note 1 (requiring the 
sentencing court to determine the most appropriate 
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guideline section “for the offense conduct charged in the 
count of which the defendant was convicted”); see also 
United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 
2009) (noting that, in assessing which guideline is the 
most appropriate, “we may consider only offense of 
conviction conduct, not all relevant conduct”) (citing 
§ 1B1.2(a)); United States v. Almeida, 710 F.3d 437, 411 
(1st Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen selecting the ‘most appropriate’ 
guideline, the sentencing court should look to the conduct 
alleged in the indictment, and not to uncharged conduct 
described in trial testimony.”) (citing § 1B1.2(a) 
Application Note 1 and the Introduction to Appendix A). 
 Moreover, we are not persuaded that the District 
Court’s selection of § 2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice) was 
the most appropriate guideline. Count II of the indictment 
charged Boney with “attempt[ing] to kill another person” 
with intent to retaliate against that person for providing 
information to law enforcement. See First Superseding 
Indictment, J.A. II–17. Conversely, Count II did not 
charge Boney with obstruction of justice. See id. Thus, 
the plain language of the indictment shows that the 
attempted murder guideline, § 2A2.1, was the most 
appropriate offense guideline applicable to Count II of 
Boney’s conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District Court erred when it selected § 2J1.2 as the most 
appropriate guideline for Count II. 
2. Count IV 
The District Court also erred in applying the 
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Sentencing Guidelines as to Count IV. Count IV charged 
Boney with violating 18 U.S.C. § 373:
11
 
Between on or about May 22, 2011, and 
continuing through on or about July 3, 2011, 
in the State and District of Delaware, 
WILLIAM BONEY, defendant herein, with 
intent that another person engage in conduct 
constituting a felony that has as an element 
the use, attempted use, and threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another 
in violation of the laws of the United States, 
                                                 
11
 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) provides: 
“Whoever, with intent that another person 
engage in conduct constituting a felony that has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against 
property or against the person of another in 
violation of the laws of the United States, and 
under circumstances strongly corroborative of 
that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or 
otherwise endeavors to persuade such other 
person to engage in such conduct, shall be 
imprisoned not more than one-half the 
maximum term of imprisonment or 
(notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more 
than one-half of the maximum fine prescribed 
for the punishment of the crime solicited, or 
both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by 
life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned 
for not more than twenty years. 
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and under circumstances strongly 
corroborative of that intent, did solicit, 
command, induce and otherwise endeavor to 
persuade such other person to engage in 
such conduct, to wit, to attempt to kill 
[REDACTED] with intent to retaliate 
against [REDACTED] for providing to a 
law enforcement officer any information 
relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense, in 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 1513(a)(1)(B), all in violation of 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 373. 
First Superseding Indictment, J.A. II–18.12 
 Again, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a), the 
District Court was required to consult the Statutory Index 
(Appendix A) to determine the correct offense guideline 
applicable to Count IV. Appendix A lists two guidelines 
applicable to an offense of conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 373: § 2A1.5 (Conspiracy or Solicitation to Commit 
Murder) and § 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or 
Conspiracy (Not Covered by a Specific Offense 
                                                 
12
  Although Count IV makes reference to both 18 U.S.C. 
§ 373 and 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B), its plain language and 
context make clear that the statutory predicate for Count IV is 
18 U.S.C. § 373. Indeed, Boney does not argue that Count IV 
should be read as charging him under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1513(a)(1)(B) rather than 18 U.S.C. § 373. 
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Guideline)). Once again, since multiple options are listed 
in Appendix A for this statutory provision, the District 
Court was required to select the “most appropriate” 
guideline. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 Application Note 1. 
 However, the District Court selected neither 
§ 2A1.5 nor § 2X1.1. Instead, the District Court selected 
§ 2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice) as the guideline for 
Count IV. See J.A. II–366. This was error because 
§ 2J1.2 is not referenced in Appendix A for 18 U.S.C. 
§ 373—and thus was not an option for the District Court 
to choose in calculating the sentencing guideline range. 
By selecting a guideline that was not referenced in 
Appendix A for the offense of conviction, the District 
Court violated the precise, mechanical process required 
by the Guidelines Manual. See § 1B1.2(a) (instructing the 
sentencing court to “[r]efer to the Statutory Index 
(Appendix A) to determine the Chapter Two offense 
guideline”); § 1B1.2 Application Note 1 (“The court is to 
use the Chapter Two guideline section referenced in the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) for the offense of 
conviction.”) (emphasis added). 
 Rather than incorrectly sentencing Boney under 
§ 2J1.2, the District Court should have selected either 
§ 2A1.5 or § 2X1.1. Between these two, we conclude that 
§ 2A1.5 was the most appropriate guideline. Section 
2A1.5 (Conspiracy or Solicitation to Commit Murder) is 
squarely applicable to the offense charged in Count IV of 
the indictment, i.e. soliciting Garrett to murder Haines in 
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retaliation for Haines providing information to law 
enforcement. Additionally, the Guidelines Manual makes 
clear that § 2X1.1 applies to an attempt, solicitation, or 
conspiracy “not covered by a specific offense guideline.” 
§ 2X1.1. Section 2X1.1 further specifies that “[w]hen an 
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy is expressly covered 
by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline 
section,” and lists § 2A1.5 as an “[o]ffense guideline[] 
that expressly cover[s] solicitations.” § 2X1.1(c) & 
Application Note 1. Thus, we conclude that the District 
Court erred when it sentenced Boney under offense 
guideline § 2J1.2 on Count IV. The District Court should 
have sentenced Boney under § 2A1.5 on this count.  
IV. 
 Boney’s challenges to his conviction are meritless. 
However, we conclude that the District Court committed 
procedural error in its application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines on Counts II and IV. Thus, we will vacate the 
judgment in part and remand for resentencing consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
